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Abstract 
Using a Difference-in-Differences approach we evaluate the effects of a 10 percentage 
points reduction in the payroll tax introduced in 2002 for firms in the northern part of 
Sweden. We find no employment effects for existing firms and can rule out that a 1 per-
centage point payroll tax reduction would increase employment with more than 0.2 per-
cent. We do, however, find that tax reductions have significantly positive effects on the 
average wage bill per employee. These are likely to be driven by higher average wages, 
but might also be due to more hours worked. As a sensitivity check we investigate if 
reduced payroll taxes affect the likelihood of firm entry and exit, and find some support 
for a net firm inflow. Our attempts to assess concomitant effects on employment indi-
cate that payroll tax reductions might yield increases in employment through the start-
up of new firms. 
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2  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? 1 Introduction 
While the motive of payroll tax reductions is clear, namely to increase employment, the 
outcome is generally uncertain. Whereas the effect of a payroll tax cut on labour 
demand will be unambiguously non-negative, it is also likely to induce counteracting 
supply responses and wage increases, potentially leaving employment (largely) un-
affected. However, it is also possible that labour supply may actually increase, thus 
strengthening the initial demand effect. Accordingly, not even the direction of the 
employment effect can be determined on theoretical grounds and, of course, much less 
the magnitude of the change. The employment effect of payroll tax reductions is, thus, 
an empirical question.  
However, empirical assessments are often plagued by limited variation in the payroll 
tax rates paid by firms or, when there is some degree of differentiation, by difficulties to 
find comparable firms that meet different payroll taxes. In the literature, the most 
credible evaluations are based on longitudinal studies of employment changes following 
the implementation of regionally differentiated tax schemes. Such schemes make it 
possible to compare employment changes in similar firms located close to another but 
differing with respect to payroll tax rate (i.e. Difference-in-Differences). Of particular 
relevance for this paper are three studies of regionally differentiated payroll taxes that 
have been implemented in the Nordic countries since the mid 1980’s. These studies are 
reviewed in Section 3. 
Section 2 describes the institutional features of the 2002 payroll tax reduction consi-
dered in our empirical analysis. In Section 4, theoretical issues are considered. Using a 
wage bargaining model as a starting point, we discuss the wage incidence of a payroll 
tax cut under various conditions. Section 5 contains a discussion of methodological con-
siderations and the outcome variables that we use. Data issues are discussed in 
Section 6. Our results are provided in Section 7 and concluding comments in Section 8. 
2  Payroll taxes in Sweden 
Swedish employers are obliged by law to pay a payroll tax consisting of contributions to 
pensions, health insurance, and other social benefits. When it was introduced in 1950, 
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  3 the legal payroll tax rate was relatively low – about 6 percent. However, the tax rate 
rose sharply in the 1960s and 1970s, and peaked at 39 percent in 1990. Since the mid-
1990s, the payroll tax rate has remained rather stable at around 33 percent (Holmlund, 
1983; Confederation of Swedish Enterprises, 2006).  
In addition to the statutory payroll tax most employers are committed through 
collective agreements, to pay around 10.4 percent of gross wages to finance job search 
support, retraining and severance payments when employees are notified about lay-
offs.
1 
Initially, all firms paid the same legal payroll tax rate. Since the early 1980s, 
however, firms in the northern part of Sweden have been entitled to different forms of 
payroll tax cuts. In 1982, firms in four municipalities in the northernmost county 
(Norrbotten), were allowed to cut payroll taxes by 10 percentage points. Starting in 
1984, firms in all municipalities in Norrbotten could reduce the payroll tax by 10 per-
centage points. In 1991, the target area was further expanded, to cover the northern half 
of Sweden with the exception of the coastline. This area is commonly referred to as 
“Regional Support Area” (RSA) A; see Figure 1.
2 
The payroll tax cut in RSA A was reduced from 10 to 8 percentage points in 1997. 
By the end of 1999 it was abandoned altogether, as it did not to comply with EU regu-
lations (SOU 2000:87; SOU 2005:68). 
                                                 
1 The information on payroll taxes according to collective agreements comes from Medlingsinstitutet (2008). To 
compute the payroll taxes rate faced by the average private firm, the payroll taxes paid have been weighted by the 
share of employees covered by different collective agreements in 2004.  
2 In Sweden two “Regional Support Areas” (RSAs) have been defined, A and B. The aim of the RSAs is to stimulate 
regional growth in more remote and sparsely populated parts of the country, through investment and employment 
subsidies. The difference between RSA A and RSA B is simply that subsidies are somewhat more common and more 
extensive in RSA A than in RSA B. 
4  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? Figure 1 The regional support areas (RSAs) A and B 
 
A new regional payroll tax cut for firms in RSA A was introduced in 2002. Again, 
the reduction was set to 10 percentage points, but this time it was restricted to annual 
gross wage bills up to SEK 852 000. This limit corresponds roughly to three employees 
with average earnings in the manufacturing sector. To comply with EU regulations, the 
payroll tax reduction was also restricted to private sector employers, not active in the 
agriculture, fishing or transport industries. Further, the reduction applied only to work-
ers below the age of 65, the stipulated age of retirement.  
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  5 The regional payroll tax reduction was put on top of an already existing general cut of 5 
percentage points for all firms in the country, introduced in 1997.
3 The same wage bill 
ceiling applied to both the general and the additional regional payroll tax reduction.
4  
The 2002 reform implied that firms in RSA A could cut their payroll taxes by 15 
percentage points up to the wage bill ceiling, whereas firms outside RSA A could only 
cut their taxes by 5 percentage points up to the ceiling. The statutory payroll tax rate in 
2002 was 32.82 percent. To this, the average payments determined through collective 
agreements amounted to about 10.4 percentage points on average. Thus, the additional 
payroll tax reduction for RSA A firms below the wage bill ceiling was 7.3 percent 
[0.10 / (1.4322 - 0.05)]. To illustrate how the payroll tax rate varies over time and by 
region for firms of different sizes, Figure 2a and Figure 2b depicts the marginal and 
average payroll tax by the gross wage bill, respectively. Both the general reduction and 
the RSA A reduction are shown in the diagrams.
5 
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3 The general payroll tax reduction was unchanged in magnitude until 2007 when it was reduced from 5 percentage 
points to 2.5 percentage points. In 2008, the general payroll tax cut was abolished altogether. 
4 In 2005, all firms received capital tax cuts, which were financed by lowering the wage bill ceiling for the general 
payroll tax cut from SEK 852 000 to SEK 741 600. 
5 The figures are schematic in the sense that the payroll costs determined through collective agreements do not 
constitute a constant share of the wage bill, but vary over time, around the average rate of 10.4 percent. 
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For firms with wage bills not exceeding SEK 852 000, the marginal and the average 
payroll tax rates are equal. For firms with wage bills over the ceiling, the marginal tax 
rate reduction is zero while the average rate (bound from below by 28.22 percent) is 
monotonically increasing towards the total payroll tax rate of 43.22 percent. It is evident 
from  Figure 2b that this increase is quite rapid; the payroll tax reduction becomes 
successively more thinly spread out over the wage bill. In a firm with a wage bill of 
SEK 2 500 000 – corresponding to at most ten employees – the reduction will only 
amount to 5 percentage points.  
It should be noticed that profiles of the marginal and average tax rates pertaining to 
the general reduction are qualitatively the same as the corresponding profiles associated 
with the RSA A reduction. This means that if firms in RSA A are representative of 
firms in other parts of Sweden, too, then inferences about the effects of payroll tax 
reductions in RSA A should in a qualitative sense be valid with respect to the general 
reduction, as well. Thus, even though the effects of the general tax reduction cannot be 
evaluated by themselves, qualitative conclusions about them can be drawn by analogy 
with the effects estimated for the RSA A reduction. 
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  7 3  Previous studies of payroll tax cuts in the 
Nordic countries 
For the sake of brevity, we focus here on a few studies that are of particular relevance to 
our analysis, namely studies investigating the effects of regionally differentiated payroll 
taxes in the Nordic countries.
6 What makes the Nordic countries especially interesting 
in this context is, of course, that they are quite similar and share many institutional fea-
tures. We will consider studies of Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish experiences, 
respectively. 
The Swedish example concerns an evaluation of the payroll tax reduction by 10 per-
centage points, that was implemented in Norrbotten in 1984 (Bohm and Lind, 1993). 
The 1984 payroll tax cut reform is similar to the 2002 reform, in that the tax reductions 
are identical and the geographical areas overlap (Norrbotten is part of the Region 
Support Area A targeted in 2002). However, there are some important differences. The 
1984 payroll tax reduction was not limited with respect to wage costs – the reduced rate 
was applicable to the firm’s entire wage bill. Moreover, the cut in the payroll tax rate 
was accompanied by a marginal employment subsidy, amounting to around 10 % of the 
average yearly earnings of a manufacturing worker in 1984. The subsidy extended over 
a three-year period, per full-time equivalent net increase in the firm’s workforce. 
Bohm and Lind (1993) used a Difference-in-Differences approach to assess the 
employment effects of the 1984 regional payroll tax cut. In particular, they compared 
the changes in employment between manufacturing firms in Norrland and in a nearby 
county. The analysis was conducted both for all firms in the two counties and for 
matched pairs of firms in the counties. In the matching approach, firms in the two coun-
ties were matched by firm age, firm size, and industry in the pre-reform period. In 
neither of the analyses could they find any evidence of statistically significant employ-
ment effects. 
                                                 
6 As it happens, studies investing the effects of regionally differentiated payroll tax reductions outside the Nordic 
countries are hard to come by. Two interesting exceptions are Anderson and Meyer (1997) and Murphy’s (2007) both 
of which employ US data, making use of variation across states in unemployment insurance payroll taxes. Further, 
Gruber (1997) estimates the effects of payroll tax reductions on employment and wages in Chile. 
8  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? The Norwegian study (Johansen and Klette, 1998), concerns the manufacturing sector 
over the years 1983 – 1993. In this period, Norwegian payroll taxes differed by region – 
from around 17 percent down to 2 percent – and the rate structure changed over time. 
Johansen and Klette (op cit) estimated wage effects, but not employment effects, of 
changes in the payroll tax rate. To this end, they employed a Difference-in-Differences 
approach, were the change in hourly wages for firms that received lower (or higher) 
payroll taxes were compared to the change in wages for firms that were unaffected. 
They also allowed for different wage trends across industries. The estimates indicated 
that a 1 percentage reduction in the labour costs led to an increase in the hourly wages 
by 0.4 percent (evaluated at the average payroll tax rate of 12.5 percent in 1993). 
In Finland, a regional payroll tax exemption experiment started in 2003.
7 The payroll 
tax was reduced by, on average, 4.1 percentage points in 14 municipalities in northern 
Finland and 6 municipalities along the western coastline. As the average rate before the 
reduction was 23.86 percent, this amounted to an average decrease in labour costs of 
around 3.3 percent. As in the Swedish 2002 reform, the payroll tax cut was restricted to 
gross wage bills up to a ceiling. However, in Finland the ceiling was set roughly 8 times 
higher than the Swedish ceiling, thus allowing most firms to reduce the payroll tax for 
the all its’ employees. In practise, most of the firms applying for the tax reduction were 
very small; the median firm had four employees. In total, some 2 300 firms with about 
17 000 employees participated during the first year.  
Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2008) evaluated the employment and wage effects of the 
Finnish experiment. They used a Difference-in-Differences strategy where control firms 
were selected by means of a two-stage procedure. In the first step, regions similar to the 
target regions in terms of unemployment, industrial structure and workforce character-
istics were selected. In a second step, firms in the target and comparison regions were 
matched by industry, the number of employees, the gross wage bill and the total sales of 
the firm, etc.
8  
In the evaluation, no significant employment effects could be found, neither on aver-
age or when the effects were allowed to vary by wages paid. Unfortunately, the wage 
                                                 
7 The experiment is planned to continue to the end of 2009. 
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  9 effects could only be analysed for a smaller subsample of large firms in the manu-
facturing and in the service sector. In the service sector a 1 percentage reduction in the 
labour costs was estimated to increase wages by 0.6 percent, while no clear-cut results 
emerged for the manufacturing sector. 
To sum up: in the two studies analyzing employment responses to payroll tax cuts, 
no significant effects could be established. Wage changes were also investigated in two 
of the three studies considered. In both cases, lower payroll taxes led to higher wages, 
amounting to between 40 percent and 60 percent of the reduction in the labour costs.  
4 Theoretical  issues 
To simplify the discussion of the effects of a payroll tax reduction on employment and 
wages we will make a number of simplifying assumptions. These assumptions are 
spelled out in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 considers likely effects on wages from a reduc-
tion in payroll taxes, as well as employment effects.  
4.1 Simplifying  assumptions 
Discussions about employment and wage effects are complicated by the fact that, in 
general, wages and employment are simultaneously determined, making it difficult to 
discuss the two separately. There are plausible analytical frameworks which model 
wages and employment as sequentially determined, however. We will assume that such 
a model is appropriate in the present context. Specifically, we make the following 
assumption: 
A.1 Wages are determined according to the “right to manage” version of the wage 
bargaining model proposed by Nickell and Andrews (1983). This means that the firm 
and the union bargain first over the wage, whereupon the firm determines employment, 
contingent upon the (real) wage. 
This assumption does not appear to be very restrictive in the Swedish context. Sweden 
has a long tradition of strong unions which definitely have considerable bargaining 
                                                                                                                                               
8 All matching variables were measured during the three years preceding the experiment. 
10  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? power, although this power has been reduced during the last decades. Moreover, the 
firm’s “right to manage” has never been seriously disputed. 
A.2 Firms are assumed to be price takers in the output market. 
For a small open economy like Sweden, where (most) firms compete in the world 
market, this assumption is quite natural. Still, it does not apply universally, of course; 
specialized domestic services being an example to the contrary. Also, most of the small 
firms targeted by the payroll tax reductions considered here probably do not compete on 
the world market. To take this into account, we discuss (in the end of Section 4.2) how 
relaxing A.2 affects our conclusions. 
A.3 The return on capital is assumed to be internationally determined. 
Like A.2, this is a very natural assumption in a small open economy context. 
A.4 Labour demand is not infinitely elastic, i.e. the labour demand curve is not hori-
zontal. 
In principle, given the assumption A.1, this assumption follows automatically; a hori-
zontal demand curve can only arise in the context of perfect competition on the labour 
market. 
A.5 The labour supply curve is not vertical. 
While the concept of labour supply is not well defined in the context of a union 
bargaining model, this assumption merely ascertains that the union has to balance the 
objectives of maximizing the wages of its employed members against the objective of 
finding jobs for its unemployed members. 
4.2  Effects on wages and general employment effects 
According to assumption A.1, firms and unions bargain about the (nominal) wage 
according the “right to manage” wage bargaining framework. The real wage will then 
depend on the union’s relative bargaining power, the level of unemployment, the unem-
ployment benefit replacement ratio, and the properties of the firm’s production technol-
ogy, as manifested in labour productivity.  
Momentarily, a decrease in the payroll tax will lower labour costs. Given that firms 
were in equilibrium before the change, the reduction will imply that the firm’s labour 
costs are reduced below the workers’ marginal productivity values. Under assumptions 
A.2 - A.5 this will increase labour demand and decrease the demand for capital. How-
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  11 ever, noting that it has now become cheaper for the firm to keep a given workforce, the 
union will demand wage increases. 
For the outcomes in terms of wages and employment, there are three crucial issues. 
The first is whether the payroll tax reduction is anticipated or known beforehand. The 
second is the frequency of wage negotiations. The third issue is the union’s relative 
bargaining power. 
If the tax reduction is known long beforehand or if wage negotiations occur often, 
then wage increases might possibly offset the payroll tax cut immediately, leaving total 
labour costs unaffected, provided that the union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high. 
In this case there will be no direct effects on employment. Possibly, there will be second 
order employment effects, to the extent that the enhanced incomes resulting from the 
wage increases raise demand in general and, hence, employment. However, such a 
second order effect presupposes that the increases in nominal incomes also yield 
increases in real incomes.  
If, on the other hand, the payroll tax reduction is not anticipated and the time distance 
between wage negotiations is large enough, then the payroll tax cut is likely to increase 
employment in the short run. When, subsequently, the firm and the union meet to 
bargain, wages will rise. If the firm’s bargaining power is large enough to prevent 
wages from rising beyond the workers’ marginal productivity and impinge on the inter-
nationally given return to capital, employment will stay at the new, higher, level reached 
by the initial increase. 
In both of these examples, the stronger the firm’s relative bargaining power, the 
smaller will be the wage increases and, hence, the larger the potential for enhanced 
employment. It should be noted, though, that the firm might alternatively choose to 
increase its profit margin. Whether the firm decides to expand production or raise 
profits also depends on its relative bargaining power. The higher its bargaining power 
the more likely is the firms to add to its workforce. Of course, the firm can also choose 
booth alternatives simultaneously by employing some additional workers, without 
exploiting the full recruitment potential created by the tax cut.  
Regarding the assumptions made in Section 4.1, it should be noted that relaxing A.2, 
i.e. allowing for imperfect competition in the output market, will increase the likelihood 
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firms lower their output price in response to the payroll tax cut unless they are 
convinced that after wages are renegotiated they will be at least as well off as before the 
payroll tax reduction. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for this to happen is that 
wage increases do not offset the decrease in labour costs resulting from the payroll tax 
cut. Accordingly, the relative price of labour will fall, inducing an increase in labour 
demand. Secondly, the aim of lowering of the output price is to enable a higher level of 
production. This will lead the firm to demand more of all factors of production and thus, 
in particular, increase its demand for labour. 
To sum up: a payroll tax reduction is most likely to be followed by wage increases. 
The less anticipated the tax cut and the less frequent the occurrence of wage negotia-
tions the smaller will be the extent to which the decrease in labour costs is immediately 
offset by wage increases and, hence, the larger the potential short-run employment 
effects. The magnitude of the realized employment effects will, in addition, be increas-
ing in the firm’s relative bargaining power. The likelihood of positive employment 
effects will be further increased if the firm is not a price taker in the output market. 
5 Empirical  considerations 
We are interested in estimating the effects of payroll taxes on the gross wage bill, 
number of employees and average wage bill per employee. We will also study the 
effects on firm entry, firm exit and net firm inflow. Assume that the relation between 
payroll taxes and different outcomes for firm j, in industry k, located in region r at time t 
can be given by the following function: 
 
  , jkrt j kt jrt jkrt Y ε λ γ βτ + + + =   (5) 
 
IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment?  13 where Yjkrt is one of the outcomes just mentioned, τjrt is the average payroll tax rate, γkt 
is an industry-specific time fixed effect, λj is a firm fixed effect, and εjkrt is an error 
term.
9  
In general, estimating the effects of payroll taxes might be problematic for two 
reasons. First, there might be limited or no variation in the payroll taxes paid by firms. 
In most countries, all firms meet the same payroll tax rate, which makes empirical 
evaluations more or less impossible. Second, firms that do meet different payroll tax 
rates, might differ also in other important respects. For instance, changes in payroll 
taxes over time might coincide with other macro economic changes, and firms in differ-
ent regions might have different outcome potentials.  
The 1997 general payroll tax cut reform and the 2002 additional tax cut reform intro-
duced yet another empirical problem. By imposing a ceiling on the wage bill for maxi-
mum pay roll tax reduction, the tax rate became a function of the gross wage bill. In 
particular, smaller firms met lower payroll taxes than larger firms, introducing the 
problem of reverse causality. Not only could the payroll tax rate affect the gross wage 
bill (through employment, hours worked and/or wages), but a change in the wage bill 
also fed back directly to a change in the payroll tax rate. 
This paper attempts to estimate the effects of payroll taxes by exploiting the 2002 
payroll tax reform for firms in RSA A. The idea is to compare the change in outcomes 
for firms in RSA A – before and after the reform – to the change in outcomes for firms 
outside RSA A (Difference-in-Differences). One complication, however, is that not all 
firms in a given region pay the payroll tax rate as suggested by the reform (imperfect 
compliance). First, the payroll tax cut was only given to firms that filed an application 
to the tax authorities. Due to imperfect information, however, not all eligible firms did. 
Second, firms could move to RSA A to receive the lower payroll tax rate. Thus, there 
might be (endogenous) variation in the payroll tax rate even within a region at a given 
point in time.  
                                                 
9 Since firms rarely change industry or region, the firm fixed effect also accounts for constant differences between 
industries in different regions. In the estimations, the firm fixed effects are handled by first differencing the data. 
14  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? To isolate the variation in payroll taxes induced by the 2002 reform, we will use the 
interaction between time and region as an instrument for the average payroll tax: 
 
  , jkrt jk kt T R jkrt D D η ϖ δ φ τ + + + × =  (6) 
 
where DR is a dummy variable for firms in RSA A in 2001 and DT is a dummy vari-
able for the post-reform period. The interaction between time and region, DR × DT, is 
our instrument. Time effects and firm fixed effects are given by δkt and ωjk, respectively, 
while ηjkrt denotes the error term. 
The identifying assumption for using the interaction between time and region as an 
instrument for the average payroll tax, is that firms inside and outside RSA A would 
have experienced the same changes in outcomes in absence of the reform. In other 
words, there should be no difference in underlying trends for firms in different regions. 
We will attempt to make this assumption more plausible in two ways. First, we will 
compare firms in RSA A to firms operating in nearby regions. In particular, we will use 
firms in RSA B as a comparison group (see Figure 1). We believe that firms in these 
regions face similar external conditions. In particular, they share the same local labour 
markets and compete on the same local product markets. Thus, labour supply or product 
demand shocks should affect firms in both regions equally. Further, like firms in RSA 
A, firms in RSA B are eligible for regional subsidies. Second, we will compare firms 
operating in the same industry. It is quite possible that outcomes evolve differently by 
industry. Therefore, we control for both industry specific region fixed effects (which are 
captured by the firm fixed effects) and industry specific time fixed effects. Thus, we 
estimate Difference-in-Differences models at the industry level, by comparing the 
change in outcomes for firms in RSA A with the change in outcomes for firms in the 
same industry in RSA B.
10  
                                                 
10 Note that region and industry are defined in the pre-reform period. Thus, the IV-estimates are not biased by firms 
moving between regions or by firms changing industries. 
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To assess the effects of the 2002 payroll tax cut reform, we exploit yearly firm-level 
data for the 2001-2004 period from Statistics Sweden (SCB). The data include central 
variables such as the gross wage bill, number of employees, and average payroll taxes 
paid. All firms can also be linked to a municipality and an industry
11, which makes it 
possible to identify the firms that were affected by the reform. A few firms with work 
places both within and outside RSA A were excluded, since it was unclear how they 
were affected by the reform.  
The main outcomes of interest are the natural logarithms of the gross wage bill, the 
number of employees and the average wage bill per employee, respectively. The gross 
wage bill is an encompassing measure of the labour demand responses to payroll tax 
reductions. It is a function of the number of employees, the average number hours 
worked per employee and the average hourly wage. To trace the source of the effect we 
will decompose the wage bill (B) into the number of employees (N) and the average 
wage bill per employee (B/N): 
 
  lnB = lnN + ln(B/N).  (7) 
 
From (7) it is clear that a zero wage bill effect does not imply zero effects on 
employment and wage bill per employee. We thus conduct separate estimations where 
the outcome variables are the log of employment and the log of wage bill per employee.  
Ideally, we would like to be able to decompose the wage bill into hourly wages and 
hours worked, because that would enable us to estimate the price and quantity effects of 
the payroll tax reduction. Unfortunately, we lack this information. We thus have to be 
content with the regressions using number of employees and wage bill per employee as 
dependent variables. This means, e.g., that we cannot exclude the possibility of positive 
employment effects even if we find no effects on the number of employees. There might 
still be positive effects on the number of hours worked. Conversely, a positive effect on 
                                                 
11 We use the most detailed (5-digit) level of industry information to define the industry specific time effects. In total, 
firms in 435 different industries are studied. 
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worked per employee, leaving unaffected the total number of hours worked. Likewise, a 
positive effect on the wage bill per employee does not necessarily imply that the payroll 
tax reduction induced a wage increase. The higher remuneration per worker may be due 
to longer working hours.  
The main analysis is restricted to firms existing in both the pre-reform period (2001), 
and the post-reform period of interest (2002, 2003 or 2004). It is, however, quite possi-
ble that the 2002 payroll tax reform affected firm entries and firm exits as well. This is a 
problem not well recognized in the empirical literature on payroll taxes. In this study, 
we will study the effects of payroll taxes on firm flows in a sensitivity analysis. One 
problem associated with this analysis is that the population of firms “at risk” of being 
established is not well defined. Therefore, we will follow the literature on job creation 
and destruction (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992), and define the population at 
risk as firms existing in the pre-reform period and/or in the post-reform period of inter-
est. For this sample we will analyse the effect of payroll taxes on the probability of firm 
entry and the probability of firm exit. We will also study the effect on net firm inflows 
(the probability that a firm enters the market less the probability that a firm exits). 
As noted above, our basic identifying strategy is to assess the effects of the 2002 
payroll tax reduction on different outcomes, using a Difference-in-Differences estima-
tor. Table 1 shows the means of the central variables used in the analysis and illustrates 
the logic of the Difference-in-Differences approach. In the first column we show data 
for firms operating in RSA A. On average, the payroll tax rate fell by 6.2 percentage 
points for these firms; see Panel A.
12 At the same time the wage bill increased by 15.8 
log points; cf. Panel B). 
The second column of Table 1 shows data for firms operating in RSA B. For them, 
the payroll tax rate paid was more or less unaffected (0.5 percentage points), while the 
wage bill increased by 14.6 log points. Thus, the gross wage bill increased in all firms, 
                                                 
12 The average fall in the actual payroll tax rate is thus around 3 percentage points smaller than the maximum possible 
reduction introduced by the regional differentiation of the tax rate. Partly, this is due to some firms not filing 
applications at the tax authorities to receive the tax reductions they are entitled to (cf. Section 5). The main reason, 
however, is the ceiling on the wage bill which makes the average reduction for large firms well below 10 percentage 
points; cf. Section 2. 
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other firms (RSA B). 
If we calculate the ratio of the differences of two changes (1.2 log points divided by -
6.7 percentage points) we obtain the IV-estimate of the payroll tax rate on the wage bill. 
As shown at the bottom of panel B, a one percentage point increase in the payroll tax 
rate reduces the gross wage bill by 0.18 percent. However, the estimate is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. 
Panel C provides the corresponding estimate of the effect of payroll tax changes on 
employment. A one percentage point increase leads to an increase in employment by 
0.06 percent. That is to say, the estimated effect is negligible. Moreover, the standard 
error of this estimate, 0.0015, is not very large, either, indicating that it is highly likely 
that the “true” effect is very close to zero, too. 
In the remainder of the paper we investigate whether these result hold up to a more 
formal regression analysis. 
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  RSA A  RSA B  Difference        
  Panel A: Payroll tax rate 
Year 2002-04  33.1696   40.0942  -6.9246
*** 
  (0.1025) (0.0322) (0.1074) 
Year 2001  39.3590  39.5685  -0.2095
*** 





  (0.0964) (0.0175) (0.0974) 
  Panel B: ln(gross wage bill) 
Year 2002-04  12.8797  13.0383  -0.1586
*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0313) (0.0367) 
Year 2001  12.7212  12.8921  -0.1709
*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0330) (0.0382) 
Difference  0.1584
*** 0.1462
***  0.0123 
  (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0123) 
  IV-estimate of payroll taxes on the wage bill 
   -0.0018   
   (0.0018)   
  Panel C: ln(employment) 
Year 2002-04  1.1657  1.3070  -0.1413
*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0257) (0.0291) 
Year 2001  1.0978  1.2348  -0.1370
*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0273) (0.0304) 
Difference  0.0679
*** 0.0722
***  -0.0042 
  (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0101) 
  IV-estimate of payroll taxes on employment 
   0.0006   
   (0.0015)   
Notes: The observations are weighted by the number of firms in different industries in RSA A 
in 2001. Standard errors adjusted for clustering (municipality) are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the 
estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1/5/10 per cent level of confidence, 
res   pectively. 
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7.1  Comparing alternative estimators 
The first column of Table 2 presents the naïve estimate of the effect of payroll taxes on 
the gross wage bill using OLS for the 2002-04 period. It shows that payroll taxes are 
positively associated with the gross wage bill. However, this estimate is plagued by the 
problems of omitted variables and reverse causality discussed in Section 5. 
One way to address these problems is to add firm fixed effects, which is done in 
column 2. This leads to a substantially lower estimate, but the association between the 
payroll tax rate and the gross wage bill is still positive. Note, however, that this estimate 
exploits variation in payroll taxes stemming both from moving along a given payroll tax 
schedule and from shifts between different payroll tax schedules induced by the 2002 
reform for firms in RSA A.
13 Since expanding (contracting) firms can meet a higher 
(lower) payroll tax rate in a given tax rate schedule, the problem of reverse causality 
might still bias the estimates in the fixed effects specification. 
The empirical strategy in this paper is to exploit the exogenous variation in payroll 
taxes induced by the 2002 payroll tax cut reform. In particular, we compare the change 
in outcomes for firms in RSA A to the change in outcomes for firms outside RSA A. As 
noted above, however, some firms did not comply with the reform, i.e. they did not file 
for the payroll tax cut or they moved to another area. Therefore we will use the diffe-
rence in trends between firms inside and outside of RSA A as an instrument for the pay-
roll tax rate. Thus, we will relate the (reduced form) Difference-in-Differences estimate 
for the outcome to the corresponding (first stage) Difference-in-Differences estimate for 
the payroll tax rate. 
                                                 
13 There is also variation in the payroll tax rate stemming from the probability to file an application for a payroll tax 
cut, as well as from firm reallocation between RSA A and RSA B. 
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The instrumental variable estimate relies on the assumptions that firms in RSA A did 
indeed face lower payroll taxes as a result of the reform (i.e. that there is a first stage), 
and that firms inside and outside of RSA A would have had the same change in 
outcomes had there not been a reform. The third column of Table 2 shows the effect of 
the 2002 payroll tax cut reform on the average payroll tax rate paid in the 2002-2004 
period. There is a strong first-stage relation between the difference in trends for firms 
inside and outside of RSA A, were firms in RSA A on average receives a payroll tax cut 
of about 6.74 percentage points in the 2002-2004 period.
14 Thus, the reform reduced the 
payroll tax rate for firms in RSA A substantially, even though the change for the aver-
age firm was somewhat lesser than the 10 percentage reduction available for small 
firms.
15 
The fourth column in Table 2 shows the reduced form effect of the change in the log 
wage bill for firms in RSA A, compared to firms in RSA B. This tells us how the 2002 
payroll tax cut reform changed the wage bill. It turns out that the gross wage bills have 
                                                 
         
 OLS  FE  Reduced  Forms  IV 
Dependent variable  ln(Wage bill) ln(Wage bill) Payroll tax  ln(Wage bill) ln(Wage bill)           
Payroll tax   0.1686
***   0.0038
*** .  .    -0.0021 
 (0.0170)  (0.0014)  .  .  (0.0014) 
RSA A × Post reform  .  .    -6.7445
***   0.0145  . 
  . .  (0.0943)    (0.0092)  . 
RSA A   0.6965
***  . . . . 
  (0.0871)  . . . . 
Post reform   0.2204
***   0.0541
***  0.1946
***  0.0417
***    0.0421
*** 
  (0.0722) (0.0043) (0.0541) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Firm fixed effects    X  X  X  X 
n  81,269 81,269 81,269 81,269 81,269 
Notes: All models include an intercept and industry fixed effects interacted with the post reform period. The 
sample is restricted to firms in RSA A or in RSA B. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipality 
are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1/5/10 per cent level of 
confidence, respectively.   
14 The instrument is extremely strong. The F-statistic is 5121 and the partial R
2 is 0.61. 
15 As noted above, there are a number of reasons for why the first stage effect of the payroll tax cut reform is not 
exactly 10 percentage points. First, only firms with wage bills below the ceiling received the full 10 average payroll 
tax cut. The larger the firm, the smaller the average payroll tax reduction. Second, not all firms filed an application to 
receive the payroll tax cut. Third, older employees (above 65 years of age) did not qualify for the payroll tax cut. 
Four, some firms moved in or out of RSA A. 
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difference is not statistically significantly different from zero. On average, firms in RSA 
A increased their wage bill with 1.45 percent more than firms in RSA B over the 2002-
2004 period. 
The last column of Table 2 presents the IV-estimate of the effect of the payroll tax 
rates on the log wage bill. The IV-estimator relates the Difference-in-Differences 
estimate for the wage bill to the corresponding Difference-in-Differences estimate for 
the payroll tax rate, by simply dividing the (reduced form) outcome effect by the (first 
stage) payroll tax effect. The result show that a one percentage increase in the payroll 
tax rate leads to 0.21 percent lower wage bill, although the effect is not statistically 
different from zero. Note, however, that the IV-estimate is significantly lower than the 
corresponding fixed effects estimate in column two.
16 
7.2 Sample  restrictions  and choice of comparison region 
In Table 3 we let the IV-estimate be subject to different model specification checks. 
Column 1 in Table 3 simply reproduces the last column in Table 2. In the next two 
columns the sample is divided into firms above and below the wage bill ceiling in 2001, 
respectively. Firms in RSA A with wage bills exceeding SEK 852 000 SEK, did not 
receive any marginal payroll tax cut. Instead, the 2002 reform acted as an income 
subsidy, changing only the firms’ average payroll tax. From a theoretical point of view, 
one would expect the effect for these firms to be small. Since only about one quarter of 
the firms had wage bills above the ceiling in 2001, restricting the analysis to larger 
firms leads to even less precise estimates, however. Interestingly enough, the estimate 
for firms below the wage bill ceiling, reported in column 3, does not loose in precision 
as the sample size falls. The estimate is now significantly different from zero, but does 
not differ from the estimate for all firms (column 1). Since firms of different sizes might 
compete with each other, we will keep the sample intact in the remaining analysis. 
                                                 
16 The IV-estimate in the last column of Table 2 and the IV estimate in the bottom of Panel B in Table 1 differ in 
precision. This is probably due to the fact that the full model in Table 2 accounts for firm fixed effects and industry 
specific time effects. 
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different sample restrictions and comparison regions 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)         
Payroll tax    -0.0021    0.0038  -0.0028
**   -0.0031
**     -0.0029 
  (0.0014)  (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) 
Wage  bill  restrictions:       
- Wage bill ≤ 852,000     X    
- Wage bill > 852,000   X      
Study region:       
-  RSA  A  X X X X X 
- Excluding remote areas          X 
Comparison region:      
-  RSA  B  X X X X X 
- Excluding border areas        X   
n  81,269    21,100     60,169     70,642      68,692     
Notes: All models include an firm fixed effects, time fixed effects and industry fixed effects interacted with 
the post reform period. The wage bill restrictions refers to the pre-reform year (2001). Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on municipality are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the estimate is significantly different 
from zero at the 1/5/10    per cent level of confidence, respectively.
In columns 4 and 5 we investigate how the choice of comparison area affects our 
estimates. As noted above, we choose to compare firms in RSA A to firms in RSA B, 
since these firms are likely to share the same local labour market and compete on the 
same local product market. Thus, shocks to these local markets are likely to hit all firms 
in RSA A and RSA B equally. One shortcoming with this choice of comparison group, 
however, is that firms in RSA B located close to RSA A might loose market shares to 
firms in RSA A. Since only firms in RSA A receive the payroll tax cut, they are proba-
bly able to lower their product prices more than firms in RSA B. It is, thus, possible that 
firms in RSA A might expand at the expense of lower employment for firms in RSA B. 
This would tend to overstate the effect of the payroll tax reduction. 
In column 4 we have replaced RSA B by a region that is located close to RSA A but 
that does not share its borders. Firms in this area are less likely to compete on the same 
local markets as firms in RSA A and, thus, should not be directly affected by the payroll 
tax cut reform. On the other hand, since the latter firms probably act on other markets 
than the firms in RSA A, they might also be less comparable. The estimated effect of 
payroll taxes is actually larger when using this more remote comparison area, even 
though the estimates in column one and four are not significantly different from each 
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in RSA A with firms in RSA B would tend overstate the effects due to unfair competi-
tion. Quite to the contrary, the use of more distant comparison regions seems to lead to 
higher (point) estimates, indicating that the corresponding firms might be less compara-
ble to firms in RSA A. Thus, we feel confident in keep using RSA B as our main com-
parison area. 
A related concern is that firms in RSA A located far away from the border might not 
be entirely comparable to firms in RSA B. Therefore, the last column of Table 3 
excludes firms in the far north-western part of RSA A. This leads to a point estimate 
that is somewhat larger in magnitude than the estimate in column one. However, due to 
the sample in column five being smaller, the standard errors also increases, making the 
estimated effects with and without the most distant areas of RSA A not significantly 
different from one another. Thus, we think it is reasonable to keep all firms in RSA A in 
the analysis. 
7.3  Effects on employment and wage bill per employee 
As noted in Section 6, eq. (7), the wage bill effect can be decomposed into effects on the 
number of employees and average wage bill per employee. The corresponding estimates 
are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4 IV estimates of the effect of payroll taxes on different outcomes, 2001-04 







ln(Wage bill / 
employment)       
Post-reform year     
2002 -0.0003  0.0010  -0.0013 
n = 42,984        (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
2003 -0.0019  -0.0003  -0.0016 
n = 39,380          (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
2004 -0.0042
** -0.0003  -0.0040
*** 
n = 36,062        (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
2001-04 -0.0021 0.0001  -0.0023
*** 
n = 81,269      (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
 
Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. All models include firm fixed effects, time 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects interacted with the post reform period. The sample is 
restricted to firms in RSA A or in RSA B in the pre-reform year (2001). Standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on municipality are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the estimate is significantly different 
from zero at the 1/5/10 per cent level of confidence, respectively.   
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separate estimates for the years covered by this period. It can be seen that the 2004 
wage bill effect differs from the effects in 2002 and 2003 by being much larger and also 
statistically significant. Indeed, the fact that the estimate of the average outcome is 
almost statistically significant derives almost entirely from the 2004 effect. This pattern 
is even more marked in the last column of the table, displaying the effects on the wage 
bill per employee. These results are consistent with the fact that major wages negotia-
tions were finalized in Sweden during the year 2004.
17 
The effect on the wage bill per employee, as measured by the average estimate for 
2002-2004, says that a 1 percentage point reduction in the payroll tax rate increased 
wages by 0.23 percent. Accordingly, of the 10 percentage point reduction in payroll 
taxes induced by the regional differentiation the incidence on wages was 1/4. 
To compare our results by those obtained in the Norwegian study by Jakobsen and 
Klette (1978), cited in Section 3, we have to convert our estimate to the impact of a 1 
percent reduction in labour costs (wages + payroll taxes). Since total payroll taxes were 
38.22 (43.22 - 5) when the regional differentiation was introduced, a 1 percent reduction 
in the labour costs corresponds to 1.3822 times a reduction of 1 percentage point in the 
payroll tax rate. Accordingly, a 1 percent reduction in labour costs (per employee) 
increases wages (per employee) by 1.3822 × 0.23 ≈ 0.32 percent, which is in the same 
ball park as the estimates reported by Jakobsen and Klette (op cit). 
Our finding that there are no significant effects on employment is also in accordance 
with the previous literature. As noted in Section 3, no significant employment effects 
could be established in connection with regionally differentiated payroll taxes in the 
north of Sweden in the 1980’s [Bohm and Lind (1993)] and in Finland in the beginning 
of the second millennium [Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2008)]. 
7.4  Effects on firm entry and firm exit 
So far, the analysis has been restricted to firms existing both before and after the 2002 
reform. It is quite possible, however, that a payroll tax rate reduction can affect firm 
                                                 
17 The 2004 negotiations were some of the most extensive during the second millennium, with respect to coverage of 
the national labour market (Medlingsinstitutet, 2005). 
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growth of new firms. Table 5 shows the effects of payroll taxes on the probability of 
firm entry, the probability of firm exit and the net effect of firm entry and firm exit (net 
firm inflow). The first column reports positive and significant effects on firm entry from 
payroll tax reductions for all of the outcome years considered. The average estimate of -
0.0011 implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the payroll tax rate reduces the 
probability of firm entry by 0.11 percentage points. And, by symmetry, a 1 percentage 
point reduction in the payroll tax rate increases the probability of firm entry by 0.11 
percentage points.
18 
Table 5 IV estimates of the effect of payroll taxes on firm flows, 2001-04 
 
The second column of Table 5, report the effects on firm exits. Contrary to the firm 
entry effects, however, we do not find any statistically significant effect of payroll taxes 
on firm exits. Since both the firm entry and the firm exit effects are measured with 
uncertainty, the net effect of the two effects is not significantly different from zero. 
Thus, even though we find some support for an increase in the number of entering 
firms, we can not say that a decrease in the payroll taxes affects the net of firm entry 
                                                 
 
  
Dependent variable  Firm entry  Firm exit  Net firm inflow       
Post-reform year     
2002   -0.0010
* -0.0006   -0.0004 
n = 52,440    (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
2003   -0.0010
*   -0.0001   -0.0009 
n = 52,978      (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
2004 -0.0014
*** -0.0001    -0.0013 
n = 53,326    (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
2001-04   -0.0011
**   -0.0003   -0.0009 
n = 110,484     (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. All models include firm fixed 
effects, time fixed effects and industry fixed effects interacted with the post reform period. 
The sample is restricted to firms in RSA A or in RSA B, that were active in the pre-reform 
year (2001) and/or in the given post-reform year. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on 
municipality are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the estimate is significantly different from zero at 
the 1/5/10 per cent level of confidence, respectively. 
18 In the 2002-04 period, on average 5.13 percent of the firm population in RSA A were new entrants. Thus, the firm 
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tax changes on changes in the firm population are not very important. Nevertheless, if 
entering firms on average are larger than exiting firms, payroll taxes might still affect 
employment through firm entry and exit. This possibility is investigated in the next 
subsection. 
7.5 Employment  effects  accounting for firm entry and exit 
Extending the analysis to also include firms that either entered or left the market during 
the period of study, we have to consider the problem of how to handle zero-valued 
observations. Up to now, the outcome variables have been expressed in logarithmic 
form. However, the logarithm of zero is not well defined. This problem can be dealt 
with in many alternative ways, some of which are illustrated in Table 6. The first 
column just replicates our estimates of the employment effects when excluding firms 
with zero-value observations.  
Our first approach is to assign a small positive number to the zero observations. Two 
examples of this approach are provided in the second and third columns of Table 6, 
where firms with zero employment are assigned employment numbers equal to 0.50 and 
0.25, respectively. We find some support for a positive employment effect from reduced 
payroll taxes under both of these specifications. In particular, the 2002-04 specification 
where zero employment is set to 0.5 is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent 
level of confidence. 
                                                                                                                                               
entry effect of -0.0011 corresponds to a decrease in the probability of firms entering the market by about 2 percent. 
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for employment effects from firm entries and firm exits 
 
Apparently, the non-linearity close to zero of the logarithmic transformation is 
important. Moreover, the value chosen to substitute for zero observations matters. 
Neither of these findings is very comforting – functional form and numeric precision are 
not solid foundations for the identification of effects. 
In the last column of Table 6 we consider yet another approach to deal with the zero-
valued observation. Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) we define the observed 
change (in the level of) employment relative to the arithmetic mean of the two points. 
By so doing, we avoid zero observations and obtain a relative change that is bounded by 
the closed interval [-2, 2].
19 Although the estimates in the last column are of about the 
same magnitude as the earlier ones, they are measured with lower precision. Thus, none 
of them are significantly different from zero. 
The Davis and Haltiwanger approach has the advantage that it has been developed 
specifically to analyze firm entry and exit. Moreover, it leaves less room for manipula-
tion than the procedure of assigning arbitrary (positive) values to the zero observations. 
Still, the transformation used has one feature that isn’t very appealing: by defining the 
change relative to the mean of the pre- and post-reform levels it (partly) “conditions” on 
the outcome. 
                                                 




0 is excluded 
ln(Employment) 
0 is set to 0.50 
ln(Employment)
0 is set to 0.25 
Job creation/ 
destruction         
Post-reform year      
2002  0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0001 
n = 52,440    (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
2003 -0.0008  -0.0034
** -0.0041
* -0.0019 
n = 52,978      (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
2004  -0.0010 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0023 
n = 53,326    (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0022) 
2001-04 -0.0002  -0.0026
* -0.0032  -0.0015 
n = 110,484     (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Notes: Each estimate comes from a separate regression. All models include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects 
and industry fixed effects interacted with the post reform period. The sample is restricted to firms in RSA A or in 
RSA B, that were active in the pre-reform year (2001) and/or in the given post-reform year. Standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on municipality are in parantheses. ***/**/*=the estimate is significantly different from zero 
at the 1/5/10 per cent level of confidence, respectively.   
19 Formally, the job creation/destruction rate is given by: (et-et-1)/((et+et-1)/2), where et is employment in at time t. 
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potentially be of importance. Using different approaches to deal with zero employment, 
we find point estimates corresponding to larger positive effects of payroll tax cuts than 
when we restrict the analysis to existing firms. On the other hand, only in a few cases 
are the estimates significantly different from zero (and then mostly at the lower level of 
confidence). 
8 Concluding  comments 
To relate our results to the previous literature, it is useful to make a distinction between 
two populations of firms that we consider in our empirical analysis. The first population 
consists of firms that existed in 2001, i.e. before the introduction of the regionally 
differentiated payroll tax in 2002, and in at least one of the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 – 
“existing” firms for short. The second population contains the existing firms and, in 
addition, firms that either were established or closed down during the 2001-2004 period 
– “all” firms, for short. 
With respect to the existing firms, our results are very much in line with the earlier 
literature. Thus, we do not find that the regionally differentiated payroll tax has had any 
significant effects on employment. In this context, it is noticeable that the reform we are 
investigating involved a decrease in the payroll tax rate that in terms of percentage 
points reduction was more than twice as large as the reduction in the recent Finnish 
experiment evaluated by Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2008), Thus, the reduction that we 
consider can hardly be dismissed as too small to care about, especially as the eligible 
firms receive it unconditionally.
20 
We do find significant estimates of positive wage effects; the wage incidence is on 
average 1/4 of the payroll tax reduction. This result is also in line with previous empiri-
cal research. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that in the wage bargain-
ing process the employers and the unions treat the cost reduction as a windfall gain 
which they split among themselves. That the employers are able to reap 75 percent of 
                                                 
20 Given this result it seems reasonable to conclude that the general reduction of the Swedish payroll tax rate by 5 
percentage points, introduced in 1997, has not had any positive employment effects for existing firms, either. 
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relatively modest wage incidence might also be due to the fact that firms in RSA A only 
employ a small fraction of workers in the country. Thus, they probably have little 
weight in the industry level wage negotiations. A nation-wide payroll tax refom might 
have quite different wage effects. 
Another qualification is in place here. Due to data constraints, we have been confined 
to analyzing the effects on the number of employees and on the wage bill per employee, 
instead of measuring employment in terms of hours work and wages in terms of hourly 
or monthly pay. Thus, e.g., we cannot rule out the possibility that while leaving the 
number of employees unaffected the tax cut may have affected employment in terms 
average hours per employee. 
With respect to the estimations where we allow for entry and exit of firms – our “all” 
firms analysis – we haven’t found any results in the previous literature. This is most 
likely due to the problems associated with the definitions of entry and exit, as well as 
the corresponding outcome variables. Our estimations reflect this uncertainty; we have 
tried different alternatives and still have not taken a stand regarding preferable specifi-
cations. 
Estimating, first, linear probability models of entry and exit, we find that, throughout, 
payroll tax reductions have positive and significant effects on firm entry. On average, a 
1 percentage point in the payroll tax rate increases the probability of entry by 0.11 
percentage points. In contrast, the point estimates of the impact on firm exit are very 
unstable with respect to both magnitude and sign, and never significant. The point esti-
mate of the net effect is negative but never significantly different from zero. 
To investigate whether employment might be affected through firm entry/exit, we 
have tried several alternative employment regressions were all firms are included that 
existed in the pre-reform year and/or in the post-reform years considered. In so doing, 
we have to account for zero-valued observations. Unfortunately, the estimates are 
sensitive to the method chosen to handle the zero observations. We tentatively 
conclude, however, that it appears that the positive effects of a payroll tax reduction on 
firm entry might yield positive effects on employment, too. In any case, we believe that 
by extending the effect analysis from the impacts on already existing firms to firms 
30  IFAU – Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? flowing in and out of the firm population we have opened up for further interesting 
research. 
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